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INTRODUCTION

The stakes could hardly be higher for the 2020 decennial census.1
This constitutionally mandated count of U.S. residents will be used to
1. This Essay was written between December 2019 and February 2020, as plans
for the newly online-first decennial census were finalized and released, with the goal
of informing different communities of practice about the changes taking place as the
census evolved to a mostly-digital platform and the resulting digital inequities that
could emerge. Because conditions, context, and knowledge were evolving rapidly,
this Essay was written from the contemporaneous perspective of an applied
researcher with what information was publicly available at the time. A version of this
work was presented at the October 2019 Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh
Colloquium and refined over time as new information became available, and
included original analysis conducted by the author and associates. However, the
coronavirus pandemic has had material impact on the dynamics presented in this
Essay, and any further analysis must take the current crisis into account. In effect, the
pandemic has only served to underscore and deepen the main digital equity concern
presented here: i.e., that uneven access to the internet might impact response rates
for particular communities, and create a higher bar for them to be counted toward
the population totals that shape funding and electoral processes. Since the Decennial
count began in March 2020 — just as the pandemic reached crisis level in New York
State — there are reports of a few critical developments: First, due to social
distancing concerns, the Census Bureau delayed the rollout of field enumeration
(household canvassing) activities by almost three months, to late May 2020, and also
postponed the deadline for finalizing the count to October 31, 2020. It is unclear how
the requirement for social distancing will impact the nature and extent of field
enumeration. See Hansi Lo Wang, In 13 States, Census Bureau to Resume
Hand-Delivering Forms, Hiring Workers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 4, 2020, 8:28 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/04/850371670/in-13-sta
tes-census-bureau-to-resume-hand-delivering-forms-hiring-workers
[https://perma.cc/DKV2-EYCN]. In addition, the new reporting deadline may be too
late for some states to reapportion political representation and electoral districts in
time for the 2022 elections. This could force legislatures to draw political lines using
data other than the census, which could create legal and constitutional challenges.
See Max Greenwood, Census Delay Threatens to Roil Redistricting, HILL (May 15,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/497681-census-delay-threatens-to-roil-redistr
icting [https://perma.cc/HNL2-G4LG]. Second, journalistic reports quote county
officials saying that they have not received funds promised by the states for local field
operations to get out the count, possibly because money has been diverted to
pandemic response. See Lana Bellamy, Mid-Hudson Residents Urged to Respond to
2020
Census,
TIMES
HERALD-REC.
(Apr.
17,
2020,
4:52
PM),
https://www.recordonline.com/news/20200417/mid-hudson-residents-urged-to-respon
d-to-2020-census [https://perma.cc/2MK6-F2R8]. And third, due to the closure of
libraries, schools, and government offices, the majority of public internet access sites
for online census survey response have not been available to underconnected
populations. See Jon Campbell et al., Health Crisis Hurts New York Census
Response
Efforts,
GOV’T
TECH.
(May
1,
2020),
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decide the allocation of up to $1 trillion in federal funding for
infrastructure, social programs, and loans, to redraw electoral
districts, and to reapportion political representation at the federal,
state, and local levels.2 Moreover, the decennial census provides a
picture of who we are as a country — our stories, our identities, and
how our society is evolving. It is the most basic civic infrastructure,
the core data that informs decision-making by and for the people.
Article 1, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the
government must conduct a complete count every ten years, and also
specifies that the count must be an “actual enumeration”3 — in other
words, the Census Bureau may not use statistical sampling methods to
generate population estimates but must count each and every resident
of the country. As the U.S. population has grown, the count has
become more expensive and complicated. Since 1970, the cost of
conducting the census has approximately doubled each decade.4 The

https://www.govtech.com/civic/Health-Crisis-Hurts-New-York-Census-Response-Eff
orts.html [https://perma.cc/89HF-JKCF] (noting that one of the reasons for a poor
early response rate in the cities is a “smaller percentage of homes with high-speed
Internet access”). Contemporaneous tracking of self-response conducted by the City
University of New York’s Graduate Center has found that there is a large and
growing gap (as of May 7, 2020, 14 percentage points) between more robust response
from better-connected “Internet First” neighborhoods over lower response from
“Internet Choice” neighborhoods, which have been identified by the Census Bureau
has more likely to lack internet connections at home. CUR Research Initiatives,
GRADUATE
CTR.:
CUNY,
https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Ce
nters-and-Institutes/Center-for-Urban-Research/CUR-research-initiatives
[https://perma.cc/9PN4-MCXX] (last visited May 26, 2020); Census 2020 Response
GRADUATE
CTR.:
CUNY,
Rate
Analysis:
Week
7,
https://www.gc.cuny.edu/Page-Elements/Academics-Research-Centers-Initiatives/Ce
nters-and-Institutes/Center-for-Urban-Research/CUR-research-initiatives/Census-20
20-Response-Rate-Analysis-Week-7 [https://perma.cc/X7HR-Z4GX] (last visited
May 26, 2020) (“The gap between the average response rate for Internet First and
Internet Choice tracts also had grown to almost 14 points. A week earlier, the gap
was 13 points, and the week prior it was 10 points.”).
2. About the Decennial Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about.html
[https://perma.cc/CF7G-V7RC]; Tracy Gordon, TaxVox: State and Local Issues: The
Census Is about Nearly $1 Trillion in Federal Spending, Not Just Elections, TAX
POL’Y
CTR.
(June
27,
2019),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/census-about-nearly-1-trillion-federal-spendi
ng-not-just-elections [https://perma.cc/PT7A-H67T].
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-193, 2010 CENSUS: DATA
COLLECTION OPERATIONS WERE GENERALLY COMPLETED AS PLANNED, BUT
LONG-STANDING CHALLENGES SUGGEST NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS (2010).
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2010 Census cost a total of $12.3 billion, roughly $42 per capita and $2
billion over the Bureau’s $11 billion estimate.5
Due to the 2010 cost overrun, and given the expectation of only
increasing cost and complexity, the Government Accountability
Office called on the Census Bureau to address cost and design issues
in its preparation for 2020.6 The Bureau decided to create cost
savings by moving to digital platforms for address canvassing
The move to digital
operations and census questionnaires.7
operations has been fraught, as the Government Accountability
Office has reported concerns about cybersecurity, digital platform
performance, and public readiness just a month before the public
launch.8
The 2020 decennial census is also rolling out against a backdrop of
political turmoil, after a contentious fight over the proposed addition
of a citizenship question to the census questionnaire. Government
experts and civil rights groups worried that the addition of such a
question would chill participation among some populations, especially
given the Trump Administration’s expansion of policies to curb the
flow of migration and to detain and deport undocumented
immigrants.9 The case went all the way to the Supreme Court,10
which handed down a decision to block the question — not based on
whether the question itself was legitimate, but because opposing
counsel provided evidence that Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
had used pretextual grounds to justify the question’s addition.11 Ross
had claimed that he was directing the Census Bureau to add the
question at the behest of the Justice Department, whereas evidence
5. Id.
6. Alexis Farmer, Digitizing the 2020 Census, BRENNAN CTR.

FOR JUST. (Mar.
27,
2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/digitizing-2020-census
[https://perma.cc/UL5T-FYZU].
7. Id.
8. Lia Russell, GAO, Congress Warn on Census Staffing, Cyber, FCW (Feb. 12,
2020),
https://fcw.com/articles/2020/02/12/census-cyber-workforce-hearing-russell.aspx
[https://perma.cc/85DT-CPSE].
9. Michael Wines, 2020 Census Won’t Have Citizenship Question as Trump
Administration
Drops
Effort,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/trump-census-citizenship-question.html
[https://perma.cc/5PDR-QBUV].
10. Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
11. Id. at 2575; Katie Rogers et al., Trump Says He Will Seek Citizenship
Information from Existing Federal Records, Not the Census, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/us/politics/census-executive-action.html
[https://perma.cc/H4QX-AHFT]; Wines, supra note 9.
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showed that Ross had proposed the addition himself.12 While the
Trump Administration dropped its fight for the citizenship question,
it subsequently issued an Executive Order instructing federal agencies
to provide the Census Bureau with any available data relevant or
indicative of citizenship status, in a bid to eliminate non-citizens from
the population counts used to draw political boundaries.13
In fact, the defeat of the question opened the door instead to the
Trump Administration’s Executive Order 13880: Collecting

Information About Citizenship Status in Connection with the
Decennial Census, issued July 11, 2019, ordering federal agencies and

departments, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
, to provide the Census Bureau with administrative records to assist in
determining the number of citizens, lawfully present non-citizens, and
unauthorized immigrants in the United States during the decennial
census (2020 Census).14
On December 20, 2019, DHS released a Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) on this Executive Order.15 In its analysis, DHS
explained the Census Bureau’s plan to create, for each person
counted in 2020, a “unique person identifier, called a Protected
Identification Key (PIK). The PIKs will be used to link each person’s
citizenship information to their 2020 Census record.”16 Regarding
immigrants and refugees, the PIA specified that DHS-provided data
flowing to the Bureau would include alien registration numbers,
social security numbers, places of residents, and data. DHS went on
to cite risks regarding compliance with the Executive Order, such that
the Census Bureau “may use DHS data for unauthorized purposes”
and that it “will retain DHS information for longer than necessary.”17
The PIA made it clear that DHS does not know how long the Census
Bureau will retain data and analysis derived from the 2020 Census.18
This reshaping of the decennial census into a digital operation with
significant data inputs and outputs constitutes a radical
transformation of our core public information infrastructure. The

12.
13.
14.
15.

Rogers et al., supra note 11.

Id.

Exec. Order No. 13880, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,821 (July 16, 2019).
OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
IMMIGRATION-RELATED INFORMATION SHARING WITH U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1
(2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs079-sharingwithce
nsus-december2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYA2-KAXW].
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
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Census Bureau has redesigned its systems from end to end,
outsourcing the creation of advanced statistical and geographic
models for address canvassing and a brand-new online data collection
tool to contract software developers.19 With little fanfare and
minimal field testing, our largest peacetime mobilization is thus
moving irrevocably into the realm of big data, civic intelligence, and
networked platforms.20 While the digitization of civic systems like
voting technologies is broadly analyzed, relatively little attention has
been paid to the possible consequences of the massive transition of
the census. It is critical to address this gap by examining the
development and proposing risk mitigation strategies. The stakes are
so high because digital benefits and risks are distributed unequally
among different populations,21 and the digitization of critical civic
processes and systems produces such mixed results.22
I. ANTICIPATING AN UNDERCOUNT: CENTER FOR POPULAR

DEMOCRACY ACTION V. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

In October 2019, the City of Newburgh, New York joined a federal
lawsuit brought by the Center for Popular Democracy Action (CPD
Action) against the Census Bureau, Director Steven Dillingham, the
U.S. Department of Commerce, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur
Ross.23 The complaint alleges that the Bureau has positioned
Newburgh for a “massive and differential” population undercount in
2020 through a series of capricious and arbitrary decisions:
[T]he government’s Final Operational Plan for the 2020 Census
drastically and arbitrarily reduces the necessary resources for key

19. Nick Brown, Special Report: 2020 U.S. Census Plagued by Hacking Threats,
Overruns,
REUTERS
(Dec.
4,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-census-technology-specialreport-idUSKBN1Y
81H8 [https://perma.cc/79NW-MPQG].
20. Issie Lapowsky, The Challenge of America’s First Online Census, WIRED
(Feb. 6, 2019, 12:07 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/us-census-2020-goes-digital/
[https://perma.cc/2CQW-JZVJ].
21. See generally VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA NOBLE,
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 1 (2018).
22. Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights
Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 192, 201 (2019); Mike Schneider, Shift to Digital Census Raises Fear of
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Feb.
15,
2020),
Iowa-Like
Breakdown,
https://apnews.com/a62a81eaac97c58fb0c2f689f014076e
[https://perma.cc/7H3N-MP39].
23. Complaint, Ctr. for Popular Democracy Action v. Bureau of the Census (No.
1:19-10917) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2019).
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activities. The Bureau has made especially irrational changes to its
programs for counting African-American, Latino, and other
members of what Defendants label “hard-to-count” communities.
Among the irrational decisions in the Final Operational Plan are
sharp reductions in nearly every aspect of Defendants’ field
operations.24

An undercount could be disastrous for cities like Newburgh, which
has a particularly high percentage of historically hard-to-count (HtC)
populations — communities that have historically responded at lower
than average rates to the decennial census.25 According to the Census
Bureau’s analysis, prevalent HtC demographics include: children
under the age of five; highly mobile people; racial and ethnic
minorities; non-English speakers; low-income people; people
experiencing homelessness; undocumented immigrants; people who
distrust the government; LGBTQ persons; people with mental or
physical disabilities; and people who do not live in traditional
housing.26 Current Census Bureau statistics show that 30% of
Newburgh’s residents are living under the poverty line, 50% are
Latinx, 25% are Black, and only 30% own their homes.27 With such a
high share of HtC populations, an undercount in Newburgh could
lead to a devastating loss of social services, school funding, and
government representation.
Yet, based on the rationale of
technology-enabled efficiencies, the Census Bureau’s Operational
Plan specifies a sharp decrease in field operations.28 Even in
communities with a high percentage of HtC populations, with the
rationale of increased technological efficiencies, the Census Bureau
will reduce the number of enumerators (field canvassers employed by
the Bureau to go door-to-door to gather census information) by

24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Ron Jarmin, Counting Everyone Once, Only Once and in the Right Place,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Nov.
5,
2018),
https://census.gov/newsroom/blogs/director/2018/11/counting_everyoneon.html
[https://perma.cc/2CQW-JZVJ].
27. Newburgh
City,
New
York,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?q=Newburgh%20city,%20New%20York&g=16
00000US3650034&tid=ACSDP5Y2018.DP05 [https://perma.cc/5V7F-WZKP] (last
visited June 2, 2020); QuickFacts: Newburgh City, New York, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/newburghcitynewyork/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/ZNK7-XP8V] (last visited June 11, 2020).
28. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2020 CENSUS OPERATIONAL
PLAN
25
(2018),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/program-management/pla
nning-docs/2020-oper-plan4.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ4R-R3RS].
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two-thirds, open only half as many field offices as in 2010, eliminate
Questionnaire Assistance Centers, and drastically reduce funding for
community partnership programs and outreach relative to the 2010
census.29
But can new digital efficiencies truly compensate for the reduction
of in-person data collection in the field? The answer is unclear since
there has been only one field test of new census technologies (instead
of the three tests that were planned initially) due to funding shortfalls
alongside implementation delays.30 Additionally, due to performance
issues with its internet self-response portal, in February 2020 (just a
month before the first public mailing of invitations to participate), the
Census Bureau had to switch to a backup system for the internet
self-response plan that has not been field-tested.31
To prepare and mitigate possible problems that could impact the
integrity of the count due to transition, it is necessary to analyze the
components of the new digital census and understand how these
might interact with the dynamics of digital access and participation,
especially for HtC populations.
II. THE MECHANICS OF DIGITAL TRANSITION

In the past, much of the cost of the census derived from printing,
postage, and the human labor cost of sending enumerators out into
the field. The Operational Plan for 2020 was intended to save the
Bureau $5.2 billion by curtailing these costs through the integration of
new technologies, keeping the census within the $12.3 billion cost
range of the 2010 decennial census and Congressional budget
allocations.32
The two significant technologies transforming census systems for
2020 include a new “Internet Self-Response” (ISR) portal replacing
the majority of paper census forms, and a “Non-Response Follow
Up” (NRFU) database platform to support the address canvassing

29. Id. at 8.
30. See Lapowsky, supra note 20.
31. Andrea Noble, One Month Out, Watchdog Warns about Census IT and
ROUTE
FIFTY
(Feb.
18,
2020),
Cybersecurity
Challenges,
https://www.routefifty.com/health-human-services/2020/02/one-month-out-watchdogwarns-census-it-change-could-create-untested-risk/163183/
[https://perma.cc/88JS-826W].
32. See D’Vera Cohn, For 2020, Census Bureau Plans to Trade Paper Responses
for
Digital
Ones,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Feb.
24,
2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/24/for-2020-census-bureau-plans-to-tr
ade-paper-responses-for-digital-ones/ [https://perma.cc/UK2Y-5D27].
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process.33 Additional new technology systems for 2020 include one
that will predict response rates by census tract based on historical
response rates (ROAM), a machine-learning tool that allows analysts
to observe and predict change over time using satellite imagery
(BARCA), and an iPhone app (ECaSE) that integrates with both the
survey portal and the NRFU database.34 To understand how the
transformation of the decennial will work in practice, the following
Sections explore how the Census Bureau’s Operational Plan describes
these systems.
A. Internet Self-Response (ISR) Portal

In 2010, the Census Bureau delivered approximately 360 million
paper questionnaires to 133 million housing units.35 In 2020, about
20% of households will receive paper surveys first, targeted to
communities with low internet access and high percentages of elder
populations (Internet Choice).36 Eighty percent of households will
receive a mailer containing a unique identification code to use with
the ISR portal and information about an Interactive Voice Response
(IVR) phone option, for those who prefer that to online (Internet
First).37

33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 15, 103.
34. See Lapowsky, supra note 20.
35. See Complaint, supra note 23.
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 9. The Census Bureau has
created formulae to determine which areas will receive paper forms versus invitations
to participate online based on historical response rates among different
demographics, as well as analysis of internet availability and uptake, detailed in its
publicly released plan. Census Bureau Announces Areas to Receive 2020 Census
Paper Questionnaires First, and Areas to Receive Bilingual Invitations, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU
(Nov.
19,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/contact-strategies-viewer.html
[https://perma.cc/A7G3-3K5Y]; see also Mapping Hard to Count (HTC)
Communities for a Fair and Accurate 2020 Census, N.Y.C. GRADUATE CTR. (Mar. 9,
2020), https://www.censushardtocountmaps2020.us/ [https://perma.cc/J4CU-7FB8]
(showing how each census tract in the United States has been categorized).
37. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 33, 202; Farmer, supra, note
6.
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Fig. 1: How the U.S. Census Will Invite Everyone to Respond38

The simplest way to respond, for those with internet access and
literacy, is to use the online ISR portal. To do so, respondents will
need to log onto the Bureau’s self-response portal and enter a unique
access code from the mailer to access up their household’s survey.
After about four to six weeks of non-response among known
households designated as “Internet First” (80% of known U.S.
households), the Bureau will follow up by sending enumerators
(canvassers employed by the Census Bureau to gather data in the
field), or non-responding households may receive a paper
questionnaire in the mail.39 For the first time in 2020, enumerators
will use an iPhone instead of paper forms to collect household data.40
The Bureau anticipates that the online ISR will be the primary
mode of data collection, with a goal of 45% online completion rate.41
However, in the End-to-End Census Test in 2018 — the only
conducted field test of the new digital system — only 32.6% of
households self-responded through ISR, according to the CPD
Action complaint.42

38. How the 2020 Census Will Invite Everyone to Respond, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2019/how-census-i
nvites-everyone.pdf [https://perma.cc/E57S-WGMF] (last visited June 2, 2020).
39. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 107. The rollout of field
enumeration activities was delayed by nearly three months, to late May 2020, as a
result of the pandemic and social distancing concerns. See supra note 1.
40. See Lapowsky, supra note 20.
41. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28, at 177. In fact, online
self-response has been much lower, especially in Internet Choice communities. See
supra note 1.
42. See Complaint, supra note 23, at 14.
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B. Non-Response Follow Up (NRFU) Platform

The Non-Response Follow Up (NRFU) platform has been in the
works since 2016, when the Bureau started gathering administrative
data including land, buildings, and housing records from
municipalities around the country, done by integrating the BARCA
(aerial imagery) and ROAM (historical response rate and projection)
systems with its address database.43 The Census Bureau has used
these combined systems to build a geographically detailed system —
the NRFU platform — showing every household on record, with the
predictive capacity to fill in gaps. For example, if the Bureau has
detailed historical and administrative records of the composition of a
particular block in terms of buildings, housing units, and households,
then, in theory, the NRFU platform should enable analysts to predict
the composition of similar geography where records may be
incomplete. In the 2020 Census, the NRFU system will also be used
in tandem with an iPhone app called ECaSE, to generate canvassing
routes and to remotely track and manage enumerators’ time utilizing
the same devices they will use for data collection in the field.44
C. Imputation, Not Sampling

According to the Operational Plan, successful integration of the
new ISR portal and the NRFU platform into the 2020 Census should
mean that enumerators will need to walk only 25–30% of the 11
million blocks they canvassed in 2010 to generate an accurate count,45
due to increased efficiencies through internet self-response and
predictive modeling — in other words, data imputation techniques.
Data imputation differs from statistical sampling in a few key ways,
bearing on the use of imputation as a constitutionally valid method of
generating an “actual enumeration” of U.S. residents. The American
Community Survey (ACS) — another Census Bureau process — uses
sampling by drawing data from statistically representative groups of
the population over time, making inferences about population trends
from a limited group of survey responses collected over one-, three-,
or five-year periods.46 By contrast, imputation infers missing data by
using patterns in existing data, with the assumption that “data are

43. See Lapowsky, supra note 20.
44. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 28
45. See Cohn, supra note 32.
46. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: METHODOLOGY
(2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology.html
[https://perma.cc/5NKW-6GEB].
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missing at random after controlling for other variables in the
model.”47 Whereas a sampling technique draws inferences based on
selected representative datasets, imputation fills in missing
information based on an analysis of all available data.
Before the 2000 decennial census, the Supreme Court in

Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives

disallowed the use of statistical sampling techniques to produce the
data outputs used to apportion congressional seats,48 requiring
instead a traditional headcount based on a literal interpretation of the
constitutional mandate.49 While there was no dispute that certain
populations had previously been disproportionately undercounted
using traditional counting techniques — mostly HtC urban residents,
people of color, and ethnic minorities — the Court held that a literal
headcount was necessary for congressional apportionment (though
not necessarily for redistricting and federal funding purposes).50
However, the Supreme Court subsequently upheld the use of
imputation in the 2000 Census in its 2002 Utah v. Evans decision.51
The Court held that imputation does not violate the Constitution’s
requirement for an “actual enumeration.”52 The state of Utah sued
following reapportionment after the 2000 count, arguing that it lost a
congressional seat due to the use of imputation — in particular, faulty
inferences regarding the number of people in housing units for which
household size was not known (HtC renters, people in poverty, and
housing-insecure people).53 Unlike sampling techniques, imputation
methods did not involve the potentially biased selection of datasets,

47. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: DATA EDITING AND
IMPUTATION
(2020),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/methodology/data-editing-and-imputa
tion.html [https://perma.cc/EE69-6EYL].
48. See Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343
(1999).
49. Id. at 332–44; see also Linda Greenhouse, Jarring Democrats, Court Rules
Census Must Be by Actual Count, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/26/us/jarring-democrats-court-rules-census-must-be
-by-actual-count.html [https://perma.cc/KJ2L-4ZMT].
50. See Dep’t of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 338.
51. 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
52. See D’Vera Cohn, Imputation: Adding People to the Census, PEW RES. CTR.
(May
4,
2011),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/05/04/imputation-adding-people-to-the-census/
[https://perma.cc/UK2Y-5D27].
53. See id.; Evans, 536 U.S. at 459.

2020]

ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL COST OF A DIGITAL TRANSITION

895

and could not be intentionally used in the same way for partisan
purposes.54
The Evans decision thus characterized imputation as “inference”
instead of sampling, arguing that the objectives, methodologies, and
nature of the processes differ significantly.55 However, an external
analysis by the National Research Council noted that while the
number of imputed people was low compared to the total size of the
2000 Census count, the share of imputed people was far higher among
HtC groups, raising questions about the accuracy of inferences
regarding those groups, since it has historically been more difficult to
collect data with these groups.56 Moreover, the share of imputed
persons in 2000 was only one-half of 1% of the total population
(1,172,144 people), far smaller than the percentages slated to be
imputed — particularly from HtC groups — in 2020, based on the
plan to reduce field data collection by 65–75%.57
Because the 2020 Census will rely heavily on imputation systems to
count a much larger share of the population, with a smaller share of
field-collected data flowing into the models, the quality and
performance of these systems is key to the integrity of the count. In
effect, this means we must trust the quality and performance of the
imputation models if we are to believe the eventual count in 2020 and
the redistricting, apportionment, and funding decisions that depend
on it. Yet as with many other new algorithmic and predictive systems
integrated into government and civic processes, we do not have
complete information about which datasets and parameters
private-sector partners have used in the development of the models
themselves.58
Additionally, as mentioned, both ISR and NRFU systems have
been minimally tested. While three tests, including one rural pilot,
were initially planned for 2018–2019, the Bureau only had funding to
conduct one test (in Providence, Rhode Island) before the systems
were complete.59 Because of the lack of testing, the public has limited
information on the stability, security, and quality of these systems —
54. Cohn, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. This reduction, in practice, will be much less than the anticipated 65–75%
due to the pandemic and ensuing delays. See supra note 1.
58. See Emily Badger, Who’s to Blame When Algorithms Discriminate?, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/upshot/housing-discrimination-algorithms-hud.h
tml [https://perma.cc/8PU2-8LSR]. See generally Brown, supra note 19.
59. See Lapowsky, supra note 20.
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in other words, how they will work at scale and in different
conditions. In fact, in February 2020, the Census Bureau revealed
that its contractor-built ISR portal was unable to handle 600,000
responses at a time without experiencing performance issues, so it is
switching to a backup system with the count right around the corner.60
Meanwhile, scholarship in the last half-decade has consistently
questioned the reliance on algorithmic modeling to predict complex
social dynamics. For example, Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz,
and Kate Crawford’s research demonstrates that when predictive
modeling systems are built with flawed or biased data, they will
consequently produce flawed results that serve to deepen and expand
the original bias.61 While the Census Bureau possesses the most
complete historical data on households and geographies across the
United States, data quality varies widely among different
municipalities, with wealthier communities better prepared to create
and digitize municipal datasets.
Specifically, the historically
unreliable quality of census data collected on HtC communities
presents particular challenges. As discussed above, a higher share of
the population in these communities will be imputed, even as the
Operational Plan cuts outreach efforts to them. In other words, based
on the Operational Plan, more assumptions will be made about the
very communities for whom we have the least empirical data upon
which to base projections.
Adding to the challenges of imputing data about the communities
we historically know the least about, HtC populations are also the
least likely to have access to the primary means of data collection and
participation in 2020: the internet.
This challenge creates a
fundamental digital inequity: a disproportionately high bar for
participation for the least connected communities.62
III. DIGITAL EQUITY RISKS

Understanding the dynamics of digital equity is thus critical to
create strategies to get HtC communities fairly counted in 2020.
Digital inequities include access and resource challenges
disproportionately felt by poorer communities, people of color, and

60. See Noble, supra note 31.
61. See, e.g., Richardson et al., supra note 22, at 197–98.
62. Dana Floberg, The Digital Divide Promises to Skew Census Results, FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
10,
2019),
https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/digital-divide-prom
ises-skew-census-results [https://perma.cc/6EFV-B7C9].
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highly mobile or housing insecure people (the “digital divide”),63 as
well as harms or marginalization disproportionately felt by these same
communities as a result of technologically-enabled predation and
surveillance.64 The 2019 CPD Action complaint alleges that both
dynamics may depress response rates among already HtC
communities.65
HtC demographics align closely with the characteristics of digitally
marginalized populations — those on the wrong side of the “digital
divide,” who cannot afford home broadband access, are
smartphone-dependent and data-limited concerning internet access,
or who do not use the internet due to digital literacy challenges or
mistrust of technology or government.66 According to the Pew
Research Center, in 2018, 25–30% of adults in the United States did
not have the internet at home, among them 53% of Latinx; 43% of
Black adults (with more than half of those earning under the median
income); 42% of rural residents; and 50% of them were age 65 and
older.67 While the Census Bureau has factored data on broadband
availability into its designation of which communities will receive
invitations to participate online versus paper forms,68 data on home
internet adoption and use maybe be flawed or incomplete in urban
areas especially.69 Furthermore, available data does not provide a

63. See generally JOHN HORRIGAN, NAT’L DIG. INCLUSION ALL., MEASURING THE
GAP: WHAT’S THE RIGHT APPROACH TO EXPLORING WHY SOME AMERICANS DO
NOT
SUBSCRIBE
TO
BROADBAND?
(2020),
https://www.digitalinclusion.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Horrigan_Measuring-th
e-Gap-v1.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL3X-CQYU].
64. See generally SEETA PEÑA GANGADHARAN, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. &
POLITICAL SCI., THE DOWNSIDE OF DIGITAL INCLUSION: EXPECTATIONS AND
EXPERIENCES OF PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE AMONG MARGINAL INTERNET USERS
(2015),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64156/1/Downside_digital_inclusion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YEK-Y8VA].
65. See Complaint, supra note 23.
66. See generally GANGADHARAN, supra note 64; HORRIGAN, supra note 63.
67. See Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/
[https://perma.cc/PGW4-N4PQ].
68. Census Bureau Announces Areas to Receive 2020 Census Paper
Questionnaires First, and Areas to Receive Bilingual Invitations, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU
(Nov.
18,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/contact-strategies-viewer.html
[https://perma.cc/JC5Q-P3AP].
69. See Floberg, supra note 62; see also Karl Bode, The FCC’s New Broadband
Map Paints an Irresponsibly Inaccurate Picture of American Broadband, VICE
MOTHERBOARD
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/8xdk8x/new-fcc-broadband-map
[https://perma.cc/M3D9-Z4B2].
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picture of digital or internet literacy, comfort, or ease of access and
use.70
The ubiquity of mobile internet may offset, but not solve, the issue
of the digital divide in online census participation, as
smartphone-based access brings its own set of challenges. The
process of typing a URL into a phone browser requires a level of
digital literacy that may be a high bar for some. Moreover, users of
the ISR portal will need to tab through multiple screens per person to
designate age, race, and ethnicity characteristics separately.71 For a
household with numerous children, or with renters who do not have
separate addresses recognized by the NRFU platform, the
household’s respondent (whoever receives the invitation to
participate) will have to tab through and fill out all screens for each
person to produce an accurate count. User experience design that
adds time and complexity to the response process could be a
challenge, especially in communities where residents are already wary
of participation in the census due to mistrust — part of the lasting
impact of the politicized battle over the citizenship question.
Indeed, in addition to the potential impact of the digital divide and
digital literacy challenges on the 2020 count, online participation
could raise concerns around data protection for some, which in turn
could depress response, especially among vulnerable and new internet
users. Many in digitally marginalized communities already express
discomfort and suspicion of online interaction due to experiences of
digital predation or surveillance, combined with a mistrust of
government.72 They may be wary of submitting personal information
online, as they interact daily and intensively with technologies of
control, surveillance, and data extraction.73
Yet the perception of digital risk and mistrust may not be grounded
in a full analysis of the new systems of the census. The Bureau did
not make detailed information about these systems widely available
prior to the commencement of the count to prevent bad actors from
misusing the data and creating vulnerabilities — but by the same
token, public interest advocates struggled to analyze how safe these
systems were. To better understand and prepare communities for
possible risks and glitches in the new digital systems, the New

70. See generally HORRIGAN, supra note 63.
71. U.S. CENSUS 2020, https://2020census.gov/ [https://perma.cc/HG64-228T] (last
visited May 26, 2020).
72. GANGADHARAN, supra note 64, at 13.
73. See generally BENJAMIN RUHA, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST
TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE (Polity 2019); EUBANKS, supra note 21.
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School’s Digital Equity Laboratory conducted a holistic
socio-technical risk assessment from February to April 2019.74 A
summary of our findings follows.
A. Digital Equity Risk Analysis

i. Fraud and Imitations
Bad actors could circulate fake self-response portals, predatory
apps pretending to be issued by the Census Bureau, or false network
credentials which new or marginal internet users and mobile-only
users especially may not recognize. Experiences of digital predation,
in turn, may also suppress participation among these populations, as
they may mistrust pop-up boxes or surveys due to bad experiences
with predatory malware in the past.75 The risk of fake or misleading
Census Bureau information or materials is not limited to digital
media. There have already been examples of fake mailers claiming to
be for the census, which were circulated for predatory or political
purposes.76 However, the addition of digital portals and systems adds
many potential vectors for false or misleading information.

ii. Cybersecurity
The Census Bureau will use HTTPS77 for data collection via the
ISR portal, encrypting survey data in transit to Bureau servers.
However, metadata (such as data about the time, duration, and
nature of digital activity) is collected at several points in every digital
process separate from the survey response data itself. For example,
internet usage typically creates activity logs — at a minimum on the
device, the browser, the network, and servers. These logs hold
important data that may be cross-referenced with other datasets to
create a data trail that could be used to identify individuals or
communities. Data theft or misuse at the point of access is not

74. See GRETA BYRUM ET AL., THE NEW SCH. DIG. EQUITY LAB., PREPARING FOR
THE DIGITAL DECENNIAL CENSUS: BUILDING CONSENT, EQUITY, AND SAFETY INTO
DIGITAL
TRANSITION
7–8,
12
(2019),

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EAA62txlBP20PKQCbR7lw-gLbALLrJMe/
[https://perma.cc/HR63-NN9R].
75. See GANGADHARAN, supra note 64, at 14–15.
76. Vinny Vella, Republicans are Spreading Fake Census Forms Throughout the
Philly
Suburbs,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Feb.
26,
2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/republican-national-committee-fake-c
ensus-forms-20200226.html [https://perma.cc/5STF-RDHF].
77. A secure, end-to-end encrypted protocol for internet browsing.
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protected by the Bureau’s cybersecurity and privacy measures, which
pertain to its own systems and servers and not to public-facing devices
and networks.78 HtC populations who do not have internet access at
home are more likely to use public-facing internet access points.

iii. Hacking and Phishing
Many public WiFi systems provided in partnership with
private-sector companies hold third-party data-sharing agreements to
generate revenue through targeted marketing. A public WiFi
network has the capacity to collect information about users’ devices
(for example, a unique MAC address) that could, in the census
context, be compared with these WiFi providers’ logs of registered
users or other datasets to create a record of physical location.79 For
anyone sensitive to concerns about state or corporate surveillance,
public-private WiFi hotspots may hold more personal risk than is
comfortable for participation in a mandated civic process.

iv. Abuse and Harassment
Organizations serving communities that are targets of harassment,
intimidation, or threats may also experience cyber threats when
Politically motivated
offering public digital access support.80
individuals or organizations could do a variety of things to suppress
the count or target vulnerable communities, from network
infiltration, disruption, or deception to data theft, to surveillance
using physical or software devices (for example, keylogging software
and hardware, other USB-delivered malware, and physical sensors or
trackers).81 Attacks aimed at organizations serving vulnerable or
targeted populations, such as network infiltration and subsequent
data theft, could impact not only data provided through census
participation but also the internal systems and files of the
organization itself.82 Simply providing public-facing internet access

78. BYRUM ET AL., supra note 74, at 14.
79. See Ava Kofman, Are New York’s Free LinkNYC Internet Kiosks Tracking
INTERCEPT
(Sept.
8,
2018),
Your
Movements?,
https://theintercept.com/2018/09/08/linknyc-free-wifi-kiosks/
[https://perma.cc/P4WG-9K79].
80. See Rebecca Koenig, How Social-Justice Nonprofits Can Defend Against
Public-Relations Attacks and More, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://www.philanthropy.com/resources/backgroundpaper/how-social-justice-nonpro
fits/5857/ [https://perma.cc/DX6Y-WELW].
81. BYRUM ET AL., supra note 74, at 14.
82. Id. at 14–15.
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for census participation could open organizations up to cyberattacks,
particularly if accounts, networks, and devices are not set up with
privacy and safety protections. Additionally, organizations and
institutions providing access may also be targeted for physical
infiltration or harassment.

v. Data Breaches
Data theft, misuse, or non-consentful83 sharing could also take
place in many ways in other census-related processes. In the process
of canvassing, well-meaning community-based organizations (CBOs)
or advocacy organizations could collect more identifiable information
on vulnerable constituents than necessary.
If they are using
proprietary applications, platforms, devices, or systems in the process,
organizations could also unwittingly give up their constituents’ data to
third parties without consent.84 In the absence of secure data
management protocols and clear data-sharing limitations, data sitting
on organizations’ and private-sector partners’ servers and networks
could invite infiltration and data theft. Finally, companies or partners
offering devices for internet access or volunteer get-out-the-count
canvassing may not have good data management practices, putting
any data left on these devices at risk after devices are returned.
Third-party vendors could also have a business model that depends
on revenue from sales of data collected through, for example,
canvassing to collect personally identifiable information (PII) such as
names, birthdates, or phone numbers.85
B. Catch-22: Anticipating Digital Risk — And Risking an
Undercount

Enumerating privacy and security concerns surrounding the 2020
Census leads to a quandary: publicly discussing these risks could have
an adverse impact on the count, while not discussing them could leave
the public unprepared to address and prepare for possible harms
emerging from hacking, surveillance, and data theft or misuse. While
community advocates, the civil rights community, and the Bureau

83. That is, data that is taken from people without their explicit consent. See
Is
Consentful
Tech?,
CONSENTFUL
TECH
PROJECT,
https://www.consentfultech.io/ [https://perma.cc/W72E-T8HL] (last visited Mar. 13,
2020).
84. This risk depends on the service and contract. For example, using a product
with an enterprise level contract should protect against non-consentful sharing
outside of that vendor’s systems.
85. BYRUM ET AL., supra note 73, at 15.
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itself are wary of publicly discussing digital risks, the legal community
may be in a position to develop strategies to mitigate potential harms
to individuals and communities.
It is critical to note here that Title 13 of the U.S. Code explicitly
provides assurances that census data will be protected and cannot be
used for law enforcement purposes:
(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the
Department of Commerce or bureau or agency thereof, or local
government census liaison, may . . .
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title
for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it is
supplied; or
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any
particular establishment or individual under this title can be
identified; or
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of
the Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the
individual reports.
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the
Government, except the Secretary in carrying out the purposes
of this title, shall require, for any reason, copies of census
reports which have been retained by any such establishment or
individual. Copies of census reports which have been so retained
shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the
consent of the individual or establishment concerned, be
admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action, suit,
or other judicial or administrative proceeding.86

However, Title 13 was written before the advent of public-facing
web-based data collection tools and algorithmic modeling, and could
not have anticipated how new digital processes may leave traces and
create the possibility of data re-identification — as detailed in
journalistic reports87 — or reinforce bias in the original datasets used

86. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1954); David Emery, Did the Census Bureau Play a Role in the
Internment of Japanese Americans During World War II?, SNOPES (Apr. 13, 2018),

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/census-bureau-japanese-americans/
[https://perma.cc/68MF-LS9F] (“Only sworn census employees will see your
statements. Data collected will be used solely for preparing statistical information
concerning the Nation’s population, resources, and business activities. Your Census
Reports Cannot Be Used for Purposes of Taxation, Regulation, or Investigation.”
(quoting 1940 Census form)).
87. See Joseph Cox, Leaked Document Shows How Big Companies Buy Credit
Card Data on Millions of Americans, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jged4x/envestnet-yodlee-credit-card-bank-data-no
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to build statistical models — as in the case of predictive policing
models.88 Furthermore, the new digital system raises concerns like
those cited above in DHS’s December 2019 Privacy Impact
Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Executive Order,

Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection with
the Decennial Census — for example, that the Census Bureau “may

use DHS data for unauthorized purposes” and that it may “retain
DHS information for longer than necessary.”89
Aside from any intentional misuse of data, asking the public to
provide internet access at scale — and basing analysis and imputation
of the count on a data collection mechanism that relies on the public
to respond online — puts the count at risk simply through an
underestimation or ignorance of the challenges of digital equity.
Digital access and literacy challenges, as well as digital risk and
trust challenges, are laid out in the CPD Action complaint. These are
critical parts of the argument regarding the Census Bureau’s allegedly
capricious and arbitrary decision-making around census preparations.
In sum, CPD Action argues that conditions likely created by digital
transition, such as issues of accessibility and trust of the process,
should have signaled the need to increase, not decrease, the number
of enumerators and volume of outreach and fieldwork in HtC
communities.90 Instead, CPD Action alleges that the Bureau has
made decisions based on an irrational contention that technological
transition will create universal efficiencies, against its own evidence:
In formulating its final decision to hire a significantly reduced staff
of enumerators for the 2020 Census, the Bureau failed to account for
and draw rational conclusions from evidence that ISR will deter
self-response and fail to elicit responses from hard-to-count
populations, and data showing that ISR rates in tests have fallen far
short of the Bureau’s aspirational ISR rate.91

Thus, CPD Action complaint does not allege that there was any
intention to undercount particular populations embedded in the
Census Bureau’s Operational Plan. Rather, it argues the Plan does
t-anonymous [https://perma.cc/KXR7-SLR5]; Charlie Warzel, All This Dystopia, and
What?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/opinion/facial-recognition-surveillance-privacy.h
tml [https://perma.cc/58JL-QF7F].
88. Richardson et al., supra note 22, at 195.
89. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (DHS), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
IMMIGRATION-RELATED INFORMATION SHARING WITH U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 9, 10
(2019).
90. Complaint, supra note 23, at 9.
91. Complaint, supra note 23, at 15.
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not respond reasonably to the facts on the ground, and so fails to
protect the rights of those populations adequately. Yet intention may
be a key factor in the outcome.
In a related transitional event, a rulemaking last year by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) raised the
bar for proving housing discrimination claims92 — in particular, when
intent to discriminate cannot be proven in the design of the predictive
algorithm used by housing providers.93 Meanwhile, the same
rulemaking also creates proprietary protections for developers who
create these algorithms, preventing claimants from examining either
the code or the data used to develop the predictive models.94
Whereas in the past, validated claims of the disproportionate impact
on particular populations or groups were sufficient to create standing
in Fair Housing Act lawsuits, under HUD’s new rule, claimants must
prove an intention to discriminate.95 The claim is virtually impossible
to prove without the ability to examine the model or its underlying
data.
Similarly, even if there is no intention to discriminate against HtC
populations via an undercount, untested and unproven census systems
could fail, or could create biased outcomes, simply because software
development contractors and census statisticians are not aware of —
or able to fully address — the dynamics of the digital divide and their
potential impact on the count. In the case of the citizenship question,
the CPD Action and City of Newburgh claimants eventually proved
that advocates for the question demonstrated an intention to skew the
data towards redistricting to favor Republican candidates by
suppressing the number of immigrants in the count.96 Even if
discrimination is not intentional, choosing efficiency and cost savings
over ensuring that HtC populations are fully counted could have the
same impact. And, in that case, populations protected by civil rights
legislation could risk losing fair representation in government.
The projected undercount could thus violate the rights of protected
classes to political representation in government, as well as necessary
92. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,
84 Fed. Reg. 42854 (proposed Aug. 8, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R pt. 100); Lola
Fadula, Trump Proposal Would Raise Bar for Proving Housing Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/trump-housing-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/2W6Q-3SCF].
93. Badger, supra note 58.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rogers et al., supra, note 11.
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social support to fulfill basic needs. Moreover, as the CPD Action
complaint contends, “the Bureau’s preparations for the 2020 Census
are so deficient as to violate Defendants’ constitutional duty to
conduct an ‘actual Enumeration.’”97
IV. RISK MITIGATION TO OFFSET POSSIBLE DISCRIMINATORY
IMPACT OF DIGITAL TRANSITION

Both the institutions of civil society and the legal community have
potential roles to play to address the challenges emerging with the
digital transition of the census. Ideally, their activities would intersect
and reinforce each other.
A. Civil Society

In October 2019, The New School’s Digital Equity Laboratory
(DEL) released a manual for census preparedness98 advocating for
public libraries in New York State to take a lead role in providing
internet access and outreach services for under-connected
populations. Long the preeminent site of public digital access and
support, public libraries have information technology systems
designed with safe public use in mind. New York’s libraries have
been leaders in setting policy and providing digital privacy training
for patrons and librarians, especially as civic processes move online,
and demand for libraries to offer digital services and support
continues to expand. DEL’s manual builds on that role, providing
curriculum for library staff and partners in their communities — for
example, immigrants’ rights groups, civil rights advocates, faith-based
organizations, and local governments, many of whom play roles in
get-out-the-count campaigns like New York Counts 2020,99 or local
complete count committees — to learn about and prepare for
providing safe and secure public access points for public census
participation. The manual is also intended to support libraries and
community advocates by providing digital resources and reliable

97. Complaint, supra note 23, at 2.
98. GRETA BYRUM ET AL., THE NEW SCH. DIG. EQUITY LAB., PREPARING FOR
THE FIRST DIGITAL CENSUS: A MANUAL FOR LIBRARIES, CBOS, AND COMMUNITY
ADVOCATES
(2019),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lW1UAdJosf_EIY2xVQ1atK93btz0omR-/view
[https://perma.cc/46PJ-M6K4].
99. NEW
YORK
COUNTS
2020,
https://newyorkcounts2020.org/
[https://perma.cc/HE88-NA55] (last visited May 4, 2020).
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information to members of the public grappling with the new form of
the census.100
Libraries and their partners could play another important role,
however: collecting information on the dynamics and success of the
digital census. As the public seeks support, information, and internet
access to participate in the census, libraries are in a pivotal position to
collect information on how many people come to their sites, what
kinds of questions people are asking, whether people experience
challenges with the ISR system, whether the system experiences
glitches or outages, and whether there are hacking or interference
attempts, or other unanticipated events. Yet, without a mandate or
funding — neither of which is forthcoming from the federal
government — libraries cannot perform this critical role. Public
libraries are already burdened by the expectation that they will
provide access and support services for census takers along with all
the other digital civic processes they support, like public benefits
applications and tax returns.
An evidence base is critical to evaluating the success of the digital
transition and applying corrections to future decennial censuses.
Further, if the Census Bureau is a defendant in cases aiming to
demonstrate the disproportionate impact of inadequate preparation,
their claims regarding the validity of the data may not be proof
enough. So, what evidence base will parties to lawsuits, like CPD
Action, need to prove or disprove the allegations? Without a census
monitoring system, it will be challenging to evaluate how the 2020
Operational Plan has affected HtC communities, or whether the
count offers an “actual enumeration.”101 There is a need for the legal
community to weigh in here, and to understand the consequences of
digital transition and algorithmic decision-making, for the benefit of
democracy itself, and every resident of the United States.
B. The Legal Community

Following, we point to a few actions that the legal community could
take now to prepare for challenges to the count, to redistricting,
reapportionment, or funding decisions, if it appears that a biased
undercount will have a harmful impact, especially on protected
classes.

100. See BYRUM ET AL., supra note 98, at 6.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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i. Fight for Transparency
Legal experts should work with digital equity and data experts to
create public records requests. These could include requests to
uncover the terms of government contracts with private sector
developers, especially terms of data use; requests to release the code
and underlying data used to build imputation models; and requests to
release data management protocols from government contractors and
agencies, especially those governing data shared in compliance with
the Executive Order. Public evidence regarding the nature of these
tools and terms of their compliance with the data protection
principles set out in Title 13 will be critical to any challenges to the
count that emerge in 2021 onward, as the data is used in funding,
redistricting, and reapportionment decisions.

ii. Build an Evidence Base
Libraries and community advocates are struggling merely to meet
the needs of the count and may not be able to develop census
monitoring systems. Legal experts who have familiarity with vote
monitoring protocols and mechanics could help find ways to monitor
and document the count in collaboration with other civil society
actors, for example, tracking glitches, system performance, malicious
attacks, and digital literacy or user experience challenges arising
during the count, from March to June 2020.

iii. Develop Collaborative Capacity
The decennial census is critical to support a functional democracy,
with the most significant governance decisions resting on the quality
of the count. The process is so massive and consequential that no one
set of actors will be able to fully anticipate and address all aspects of
the process and its outcomes.
Cross-sector, cross-disciplinary
alliances are needed to develop a shared, holistic capacity (for
example, a common understanding of data-driven systems and their
potential impact).
In preparation and throughout the count, civil society and public
focus have understandably been on calming fears created by the fight
over the citizenship question to get out the count, especially among
HtC groups. Public-facing civil rights organizations have underscored
the power of Title 13 to protect the data, privacy, and wellbeing of
populations who may face disproportionate risks in the current
political environment — because it is so critical to encouraging
participation, especially among the most vulnerable communities.
This focus, while unavoidable given the stakes, has created a gap in
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preparedness. Legal experts, scholars, and advocates, however, may
be able to help fill this gap. Trust in the decisions of government may
depend on it.
CONCLUSION

This Essay lays out an understanding of the challenges of digital
transition from a digital equity perspective. As we move into the
count, digital equity advocates are consumed with ensuring that
digital access and support needs are met,102 and preparations to
litigate an undercount due to possible flaws or challenges introduced
by the transition are outside of our core expertise. Only by building
functional alliances with other institutions of civil society can we
begin to address the many questions and possible consequences of the
2020 Census.

102. Floberg, supra note 62.

